Good and Value Synonymity

Abstract

This article started as a question I asked a couple of my very fine friends who are members of the Institute. The question was, “In formal axiology are the concepts good and value synonymous?” The occasion for this question was a remark in Rem B. Edwards’ thesis, The Essentials of Formal Axiology, concerning this matter. Our discussion induced me to do a little research which resulted in my reading and rereading various sections of Hartman’s The Structure of Value and Bertrand Rus- sell’s essay, “Definition of Number.” I found myself involved in a task the complex- ity of which was beyond anything I had anticipated, but it was fascinating and I developed a plan of action. I found that this subject impacts the movement in which we all are involved, i.e., the transition of ethics from philosophy to science. The success of this movement requires that “value” function with precision, and this depends on how it is defined, i.e., constructed. This is where Bertrand Russell comes into the picture. Hartman saw that Russell’s definition of “number,’ a fundamental concept of mathematics, had a favorable effect on the eventual transition of natural philosophy to natural science. Therefore, Hartman sought to define (construct) value such that it would have the same relation to formal axiology that number has to mathematics. He accomplished this by providing evidence, in opposition to Rus- sell’s belief, that “number” should be defined by extension, and “value” by the method he calls “similarity of intensions.” Hartman also provided information on how to define “value” such that this concept is the genus for all value phenomena in the formal axiology context. When we examine these two approaches to the definition of “value,” we find that both consist of different wording that defines the same thing as defined by the concept “good.” According to Hartman, “good” and “value” are synonymous. I believe that this situation detracts somewhat from the extensive rationale in his The Structure of Value that lays the foundation of scientific axiology. I have developed an alternate definition of “value” that makes it the genus of all scientific axiology phenomena and that professes to avoid this problem.