Reconsidering Robert S. Hartman's Formal Axiom of Axiology

Abstract

This article reexamines Robert S. Hartman’s basic axiom of axiology, “Good is concept fulfillment.” The discussion shows that the meaning of “concept fulfillment” is unclear because Hartman words and explains this in many different ways. And there are problems with each of his formulations. It asks if the axiom is truly “scientific” in Hartman’s sense of being composed entirely of synthetic and no analytic concepts. It maintains that even if it is purely “scientific” in this sense, his axiom could use further refinements and additions that are experiential and analytic. But Hartman himself intended and expected precisely this. Being usable means that it can be employed directly and practically to distinguish things that actually are good from those that are not. A plausible and usable formal axiology must do at least two things. First, its axiom must distinguish good things from not so good or bad ones. Second, the theory must tell us how anything’s good-making properties are to be discerned in the first place. The discussion shows that issues arise with the second even if the axiom accomplishes this first goal. Moreover, it is the second that is most vital. Identifying anything’s good-making properties requires adding an empirical and analytic “theorem” worded in terms of “approval” or “pro-attitudes.”